Credibility in Optimal Factor Taxation by Palokangas, Tapio
Credibility in Optimal Factor Taxation
Tapio Palokangas
Department of Economics, University of Helsinki, Finland
Department of Economics, University of Helsinki
Discussion Paper No. 583:2003
ISBN 952-10-1233-1
ISSN 1459-3696
November 20, 2003
Abstract
This paper examines optimal factor taxation when output is produced
from labour and capital and some (or all) households save capital. It
is shown that there is a reputational equilibrium in which the gov-
ernment has no incentive to change its announced tax policies. In
this equilibrium, the Judd-Chamley assertion that the tax on capital
income tends to zero in the limit holds. This is independent of the
capital owners’ proportion of wages as well as their weight in the so-
cial welfare function. The optimal wage tax is determined by a specific
elasticity rule.
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1 Introduction
We consider the second best policy where a benevolent government chooses
a sequence of tax rates over time to maximize social welfare. According to
Benhabib and Rustichini (1997), this policy is inconsistent. It is first optimal
for the government to promote capital accumulation by promising low taxes
on capital in the future. Once capital has been accumulated, however, it
becomes convenient for the government to tax capital (with no distorting
effect) rather than to impose distorting taxes on labour. The result of this
inconsistency is that promises on tax policy are not credible. We show that
if the government can tax consumption, labour and capital, then there is a
reputational equilibrium with consistent public policy. Consequently, it is
not optimal for the government to renege on its commitments.
The classical Judd-Chamley assertion says that the optimal tax rate on
capital income is zero in the limit.1 Chamley (2001) shows that this depends
critically on the existence of a perfect bond market in which private agents
take the interest rate as given, households save in bonds, and firms can finance
any amount of investment by issuing bonds. In this study, we assume that
households own firms directly. We can then aggregate firms and their owners
together into capitalists, who decide on capital accumulation. We show that
the Judd-Chamley assertion applies to this case.
Lansing (1999) challenges the Judd-Chamley assertion. When the first-
order conditions of agents are imposed as constraints on the government’s
allocation problem, one implicitly presumes that there are anticipation ef-
fects’, whereby the announced future tax rates can affect current allocations.
With a logarithmic utility function, the income and substitution effects of
future interest rate movements exactly cancel each other, so that the house-
hold needs to observe only the current (after-tax) rate of return to decide
how much to consume and save. In such a case, the steady-state optimal tax
1Cf. Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) and Correia (1996).
1
rate on capital income is generally non-zero. In this study, we show that this
argument holds only in a very specific case, while the optimal tax on capital
income is generally zero in the limit, even with a logarithmic utility function.
In this study, we put the second best public policy in the form of a Stack-
elberg differential game with the government and the (representative) capi-
talist as players. Xie (1997) argues that in such a game, one commonly uses a
boundary condition which is not a necessary condition of optimal public pol-
icy, but which is responsible for the time inconsistency in the models. In this
study, this boundary condition stems from the necessary conditions. It does
not however violate consistency, because there is a reputational equilibrium
in which the government has no incentive to cheat the public.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents
the household and public sectors and section 3 the production sectors of the
economy. In section 4, we construct the case where the capitalist tries to
anticipate the government’s best response, and in sections 5, 6 and 7 the
case where the capitalist takes the taxes as given. Section 8 considers the
limit case of logarithmic utility.
2 Households and the public sector
The formal sector can be taxed and produces goods from capital and labour.
The informal sector, in which the workers produce goods for themselves
without capital, cannot be taxed. We aggregate all goods into one, the price
of which is normalized at unity. The informal-sector output N is then a
decreasing but concave function of labour supply in the formal sector, LS:
N(LS), N ′ < 0, N ′′ < 0. (1)
Hence, more and more labour must be transferred from the formal to the
informal sector to produce one more unit in the latter. This two-sector
framework is the simplest way of introducing distortion in labour taxation.
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There are two groups of households. The capitalists save and earn profits
and a fixed share α of the total wages W . The non-capitalists earn the rest
(1 − α) of the total wages and consume all their income. We assume that
each capitalist owns only a small share of each firm, so that she ignores the
effect of her investment policy on her labour income. In this study, we use
parameter α as a measure of income distribution. The model is an extension
of two special cases. For α = 0, we obtain Judd’s (1985) case where the
capitalists earn profits and do not work, while the workers earn wages and
do not save. For α = 1, we obtain Chamley’s (1986) model of a representative
agent who saves and earns both wages and profits.
The whole population has the same constant rate of time preference,
ρ > 0. The (representative) capitalist’s and non-capitalist’s instantaneous
utilities are given by
U(C)
.
=
C1−σ − 1
1− σ , σ > 0, σ 6= 1, V
(
(1− α)W), V ′ > 0, V ′′ < 0, (2)
where C is the capitalist’s consumption, CW
.
= (1−α)W the non-capitalist’s
income, which is completely consumed, and constant 1/σ the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution for the capitalist. The capitalist’s and non-
capitalist’s utilities from a flow of consumption starting at time t are∫ ∞
t
U(C)e−ρ(s−t)ds,
∫ ∞
t
V
(
(1− α)W)e−ρ(s−t)ds, (3)
where t is time. The social welfare function is a weighted average of the
utilities of the non-capitalist and capitalist:
Ψ
.
=
∫ ∞
t
[V
(
(1− α)W)+ ϑU(C)]e−ρ(s−t)ds, (4)
where constant ϑ > 0 is the social weight of the capitalist. The marginal
rate of substitution between the capitalist’s and non-capitalist’s consumption
when social welfare Ψ is held constant is given by
ψ
.
= −[dC/dCW ]Ψ constant = V ′/(ϑU ′). (5)
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Because the government has fixed expenditures E which must be financed
at each moment of time, its budget constraint is given by
E = τCC + τKΠ+ τWwL, (6)
where τC > −1, τW > −1 and τK ≤ 1 are taxes on the capitalist’s con-
sumption C, wages in the formal sector, wL, and (gross) capital income Π,
respectively.2 We assume, for technical reasons, that there is a fixed upper
limit υ ∈ [0,∞) for the capital subsidy −τK , so that3
−υ ≤ τK ≤ 1. (7)
3 Production and investment
Capital K is the only asset in which the capitalist can save. In the formal
sector, output is produced from capital K and labour L through the function
F (K,L), FK > 0, FL > 0, FKK < 0, FLL < 0, (8)
where subscripts K and L denote the partial derivatives of F with respect
to K and L.
Because the labour markets are competitive, in the formal sector the
labour supply LS is equal to the demand for labour, L, and the marginal
product of labour in the informal sector, N ′, is equal to the wage w:
LS = L, w = −N ′(LS) = −N ′(L). (9)
Given (1) and (9), we obtain the elasticity of the labour supply in the formal
sector with respect to the wage w as follows:
ε
.
=
∣∣∣ w
LS
dLS
dw
∣∣∣ = N ′
N ′′L
. (10)
2Because the non-capitalists do not save but both wages and capital income are taxed,
it makes no difference whether the government taxes total consumption (1− α)W +C or
just the capitalist’s consumption C. The cases τC = −1 and τW = −1 are not feasible,
because the effective prices for consumption and labour cannot be zero for a capitalist.
3Otherwise, it is possible that −τK would have infinite value in the government’s opti-
mal program in section 5.
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A labour-surplus economy, for which the wage w is exogenous, is the limit
case ε→∞. Labour income W is equal to income from the informal sector,
N , plus wages in the formal sector, wL. Given (9) and (10), we define
W (L)
.
= N + wL = N(L)−N ′(L)L, W ′ = −N ′′L = −N ′/ε. (11)
Firms in the formal sector maximize profit Π by labour L taking the wage
w, capital K and the wage tax τW as given. This and (9) yield
Π(K,w, τW )
.
= max
L
[F (K,L)− (1 + τW )wL− µK], L(K, τW ) .= argmax
L
Π,
ΠK
.
= ∂Π/∂K = FK − µ, FL(K,L) = (1 + τW )w = −(1 + τW )N ′(L),
ΠKK ≡ 0 ⇔ Π = ΠKK. (12)
The capitalist’s budget constraint is given by
K˙
.
= dK/dt = αW + (1− τK)Π(K,w, τW )− (1 + τC)C ≥ −µK, (13)
where K˙ is capital accumulation (= saving). Inequality K˙ ≥ −µK means
that investment is irreversible. In the whole economy, capital accumulation
is equal to production in the two sectors, N(L)+F (K,L), minus the capital-
ist’s consumption C, the non-capitalist’s consumption (1− α)W , government
expenditure E and depreciation µK. Given (11), we then obtain
K˙ = N(L) + F (K,L)− C − (1− α)W (L)− E − µK ≥ −µK. (14)
Because the labour and goods markets are balanced by (9) and (14), then,
by the Walras law, the government budget (6) is balanced as well. Hence the
government budget is not a constraint in the problem of public policy.
4 Non-credible public policy
In this section, we assume that the government can renege on an announced
sequence of taxes. This means that the game must be solved backwards as
follows. At each moment t, both the capitalist and the government make their
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choices on the assumption that the opponent will make her choices optimally
for the whole period (t,∞). The crucial property of dynamic programming
is that the strategies of both parties are independent of the initial time t.4
The representative capitalist takes the wage w and total labour income
in the economy, W , as given. She maximizes her utility
∫∞
t
U(C)e−ρ(s−t)ds
by her consumption C subject to capital accumulation (13), given w, W and
taxes (τW , τK , τC). When the strategies of the government and the capitalist
are in Stackelberg equilibrium at each point of time from any moment t on-
wards, the capitalist’s utility at that moment t from the flow of consumption
starting at time t, given capital accumulation (13), is defined as follows:
B(K, t)
.
= max
C s.t. (13)
∫ ∞
t
U(C)e−ρ(s−t)ds.
We denote the partial derivatives of B as BK
.
= ∂B/∂K, Bt
.
= ∂B/∂t,
BKK
.
= ∂2B/∂K2, Btt
.
= ∂2B/∂t2 and BKt
.
= ∂2B/(∂K∂t), for convenience.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the capitalist is given by
ρB −Bt = max
C
{
U(C) +BKK˙
∣∣ K˙ ≥ −µK, (13)}, (15)
where labour incomeW , the wage w and taxes (τW , τK , τC) are given. Noting
(13), the maximization in (15) yields the first-order condition
C−σ
1 + τC
−BK = U
′
1 + τC
+BK
∂K˙
∂C
= ν
{
= 0 for K˙ > −µK,
> 0 for K˙ = −µK, (16)
where ν is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier corresponding to the inequality
K˙ ≥ −µK. Differentiating equation (15) with respect to K, we obtain
ρBK −BKt = BKK [αW + (1− τK)Π− (1 + τC)C] + (1− τK)BKΠK .
Trying solution λ(t)
.
= BK(K, t) for this equation, we obtain
BKK ≡ 0, λ˙ = BKt = [ρ− (1− τK)ΠK ]BK = [ρ− (1− τK)ΠK ]λ.
4The formal solution of dynamic programming is given in Kamien and Schwarz (1985),
section 21, for example.
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Hence, in equilibrium, BK = λ ≡ 0. Given (14), (16) and BK ≡ 0, we obtain
K˙ = −µK < 0, C = N(L) + F (K,L)− (1− α)W (L)− E. (17)
The government chooses taxes (τK , τW , τC) to maximize social welfare (4),
given the reaction of the capitalist (17), the dependence of labour income on
employment, (11), the determination of the wage w = −N ′(L) by (9), and
the constraints (7). Because there is a one-to-one correspondence from τW
to L through (11), τW can be replaced by L as a control variable. The social
welfare from the flow of consumption starting at time t is given by
G(K, t)
.
= max
L,τK ,τC∈[−υ,1]
∫ ∞
t
[
V
(
(1− α)W (L))+ ϑU(C)]e−ρ(s−t)ds.
We denote the partial derivatives of G as GK
.
= ∂G/∂K, Gt
.
= ∂G/∂t,
GKK
.
= ∂2G/∂K2, Gtt
.
= ∂2G/∂t2 and GKt
.
= ∂2G/(∂K∂t), for convenience.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the government is given by
ρG−Gt = max
L,τK
{
V
(
(1− α)W (L))+ ϑU(C) +GKK˙∣∣ (17)}
= max
L,τK
{
V
(
(1− α)W (L))+ ϑU(C)− µKGK}. (18)
Noting (5), (11), (12) and (17), the maximization by L in (18) yields
0 = (1− α)V ′W ′ + U ′ϑ ∂C/∂L = (1− α)W ′[V ′ − ϑU ′] + ϑU ′[N ′ + FL]
= (1− α)W ′[V ′ − ϑU ′]− ϑU ′N ′τW = ϑU ′N ′[(1− α)(1− ψ)/ε− τW ],
which is equivalent to
τW = (1− α)(1− ψ)/ε. (19)
We summarize the result of this section as follows:
Proposition 1 With non-credible public policy, the optimal wage tax is given
by (19), and capital stock K is exhausted at the rate µ = −K˙/K.
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The tax rule (30) can be explained as follows. The lower the elasticity ε,
the less distorting labour taxation is and the more labour should be taxed.
If all households are capitalists, α = 1, then public expenditures should be
financed by the non-distorting consumption tax τC and wages should not be
taxed at all, τW = 0. If the workers do not save, α = 0, and the capitalists
have no political power, ψ = ϑ = 0, then the optimal wage tax τW is equal
to the inverse of the elasticity ε. Otherwise, labour taxation is between these
two extremes as follows. The higher the relative social value of the capitalists’
consumption (i.e., the closer ψ to one), or the larger proportion of wages the
capitalists earn (i.e. the closer α to one), the closer labour taxation should
be to the case where all consumers are capitalists, α = 1.
5 The capitalist
Assume that the government is, for some unspecific reason, prevented from
reneging on the announced sequence of taxes. The formal structure of the
interaction between the government and the capitalist then corresponds to
an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium outcome for a non-cooperative, infinite
differential game in which the government is the leader and the capitalist
the follower.5 Technically, the solution of this game is follows. Determine
first the unique optimal response of the capitalist to every strategy of the
government. The capitalist’s choices can be made on the basis of the initial
capital stock without making any difference to the solution. Second, find the
government’s optimal strategy given the capitalist’s optimal response. Since
the government cannot depart from its announced strategy, then, at each
moment, the government makes its choices by the initial capital stock.
Let t = 0 be the initial moment. Given (2) and (3), the capitalist max-
imizes her utility
∫∞
0
U(C)e−ρtdt by her consumption C subject to capital
5Cf. Basar and Olsder (1982), section 7.2, for the formal solution of the Stackelberg
leadership in a differential game.
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accumulation (13), taking the wage w, labour income W and taxes (τC , τK)
as given. This yields the Hamiltonian HC and the Langrangean LC as:
HC = U(C) + λ[αW + (1− τK)Π(K,w, τW )− (1 + τC)C],
LC = HC + δ[αW + (1− τK)Π(K,w, τW )− (1 + τC)C + µK], (20)
where the co-state variable λ evolves according to
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂L
C
∂K
= ρλ− (1− τK)ΠK(K,w, τW )(λ+ δ), lim
t→∞
λKe−ρt = 0,
(21)
and the multiplier δ is subject to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
δ[K˙ + µK] = δ[αW + (1− τK)Π(K,w, τW )− (1 + τC)C + µK] = 0, δ ≥ 0.
(22)
The first-order condition for the capitalist’s optimization is given by
C−σ = U ′(C) = (1 + τC)(λ+ δ). (23)
Assume first that τK = 1. Equation (21) then takes the form λ˙ = ρλ and,
by choosing the initial value λ(0) subject to limt→∞ λKe−ρt = 0, we obtain
λ ≡ λ(0) = 0. From (22), (23) and λ ≡ 0 it follows that δ = C−σ/(1+τC) > 0,
K˙ = −µK < 0 and C = N + F − (1− α)W − E for τK = 1. (24)
Assume next that τK < 1. In such a case, K˙ > −µK holds. Noting (21),
(22) and (23), we obtain δ = 0, C−σ = λ,
C˙/C = −(1/σ)λ˙/λ = [(1− τK)ΠK(K,w, τW )− ρ]/σ for τK < 1. (25)
Variables K and C are governed by the system (13) and (25). With decreas-
ing returns to scale, ΠKK < 0, the dynamics is as follows. Because
∂K˙
∂K
= (1− τK)ΠK > 0, ∂K˙
∂C
< 0,
∂C˙
∂K
= (1− τK)ΠKKC < 0, ∂C˙
∂C
∣∣∣∣
C˙=0
= 0,
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we obtain
∂K˙
∂K
+
∂C˙
∂C
∣∣∣∣
C˙=0
> 0,
∂K˙
∂K
∂C˙
∂C
∣∣∣∣
C˙=0
<
∂K˙
∂C
∂C˙
∂K
,
and a saddle-point solution for the system exists. Hence, the co-state variable
C (which represents λ) jumps onto the saddle path which leads to the steady
state in which K, C and λ are constants, and limt→∞ λKe−ρt = 0 holds.
With constant returns to scale, ΠKK ≡ 0, there must be Π = ΠKK by (12).
Given Π = ΠKK, (13), (21) and δ = 0, we obtain[
K˙
K
+
λ˙
λ
− ρ
]
K˙=0
=
[
α
W
K
− (1 + τC)C
K
]
K˙=0
= (τK − 1)ΠK < 0.
This implies the transversality condition limt→∞Kλe−ρtdt = 0.
6 The government
Given (2) and (4), the government sets taxes (τW , τK , τC) to maximize social
welfare
∫∞
0
[V ((1−α)W )+ϑU(C)]e−ρtdt subject to the response of the private
sector, (14), (24) and (25), the function L(K, τW ) in (12), the determination
of the wage w = −N ′(L) by (9), and constraints (7). Because there is one-
to-one correspondence from τW to L through L(K, τW ) in (12), τW can be
replaced by L as a control variable.
Assume τK ≡ 1 for t ∈ [0,∞). Then, given (24), K˙ = −µK holds and
the Hamiltonian for the government’s maximization is given by
HI =V
(
(1− α)W (L))+ ϑU(N(L) + F (K,L)− (1− α)W (L)− E)− γµK,
(26)
where the co-state variable γ evolves according to γ˙ = ργ − ∂HI/∂K and
limt→∞Kγe−ρt = 0. The first-order condition for L is given by (19). These
results can be rephrased as:
Proposition 2 If τK ≡ 1 for t ∈ [0,∞), the dynamics of the economy is the
same as with non-credible public policy in proposition 1.
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Next, assume that the government chooses τK ∈ [−µ, 1] freely. The
Hamiltonian and the Lagrangean for the government’s maximization are then
HII = V
(
(1− α)W (L))+ ϑU(C) + η[(1− τK)ΠK(K,w, τW )− ρ]C/σ
+ γ
[
N(L) + F (K,L)− (1− α)W (L)− C − E − µK],
L = HII + χ1(1− τK) + χ2(τK + υ), (27)
where the co-state variables γ and η evolve according to
γ˙ = ργ − ∂L
∂K
, lim
t→∞
Kγe−ρt = 0, η˙ = ρη − ∂L
∂C
, lim
t→∞
Cηe−ρt = 0, (28)
and variables χ1 and χ2 satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
χ1(1− τK) = 0, χ1 ≥ 0, χ2(τK + υ) = 0, χ2 ≥ 0. (29)
The first-order conditions for the capital tax τK are given by
∂L/∂τK = −(C/σ)ΠKη − χ1 + χ2 = 0. (30)
Examine first the case −υ < τK < υ, in which χ1 = χ2 = 0. Because
∂2L/∂w2 = ∂2HII/∂w2 ≡ 0 then holds, the capital tax τK must be solved
through the generalized Legendre-Clebsch conditions:6
∂
∂τW
( dp
dtp
∂HII
∂τW
)
= 0 for any odd integrer p,
(−1)q ∂
∂τW
( d2q
dt2q
∂HII
∂τW
)
≥ 0 for any integrer q, (31)
where t is time. Since C > 0 by (23), equation (30) yields η = 0. Differenti-
ating (30) with respect to time t and noting (27) and (28) produces
d
dt
(∂HII
∂τW
)
= −C
σ
ΠK η˙
∣∣∣
η=0
=
C
σ
ΠK
∂HII
∂C
=
C
σ
ΠK(ϑC
−σ − γ) = 0,
∂
∂τW
d
dt
(∂HII
∂τW
)
= 0. (32)
6Cf. Bell and Jacobson (1975), pp. 12-19.
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Given these and (25), we furthermore obtain
d2
dt2
(∂HII
∂τW
)
= −ΠKϑC−σC˙ = 0, ∂
∂τW
d2
dt2
(∂HII
∂τW
)
= Π2KϑC
−σC
σ
> 0. (33)
Results (32) and (33) satisfy the Clebsch-Legendre conditions (31).
Xie (1997) argues that in Stackelberg differential games, one frequently
uses a boundary condition which is not necessary for the optimality of public
policy, but which is largely responsible for the time inconsistency in the
models. In this model, that particular condition is equivalent to η = 0, which
makes the Hamiltonian HII in (27) independent of τK , so that nothing seems
to pin down the capital tax τK between −ν and 1. In contrast to Xie (1997),
however, η = 0 is not imposed as a boundary condition, but results from the
necessary conditions (31). In the next section, we show that, despite η = 0,
time consistency can be maintained through a reputational equilibrium in
which the government has no incentive to cheat the capitalist.
7 Policy rules
From (32) it follows that
γ = ϑU ′ = ϑC−σ. (34)
Given this and (33), C˙ = 0 holds, and C and γ are kept constant. Not-
ing (12), (27), (28), χ1 = χ2 = 0 and η = 0, we then obtain 0 = γ˙ =
ργ − ∂HII/∂K = (ρ+ µ− FK)γ and
ρ = FK(K,L)− µ = ΠK . (35)
Noting η = 0, (12) and (34), we obtain the first-order condition for L as:
∂HII/∂L = (1− α)(V ′ − γ)W ′ + γ(N ′ + FL) = (1− α)(V ′ − γ)W ′ − γN ′τW
= γN ′
{
(1− α)[V ′/(ϑU ′)− 1](W ′/N ′)− τW
}
= 0, (36)
which is equivalent to (19). Hence we obtain the following result:
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Proposition 3 The optimal wage tax in the steady state is (19).
Equations C˙ = 0, (25), (35) and τK imply 0 = (1 − τK)ΠK − ρ = −τKρ,
τK = 0 and the Judd-Chamley result:
Proposition 4 The capital tax τK should be zero in the steady state.
This result is a dynamic version of aggregate production efficiency. Because
capital is an intermediate good, appearing only in the production function
but not in the utility function, it should not be taxed if there are enough
instruments to separate consumption and production decisions.
In the steady-state, FK(K
∗, L(K∗)) = ρ+ µ holds. Given (29) and (30),
we obtain the following. If η > 0, then capital is heavily subsidized, −τK = υ,
and the capitalist accumulates wealth, K˙ > 0. If η < 0, then capital income
is taxed away, τK = 1, and the capitalist exhausts its wealth, K˙ < 0. In
equilibrium η = 0, capital is K held constant K∗. We conclude as follows:
Proposition 5 The steady-state level for capital, K∗, is determined by
ρ+ µ = FK(K
∗, L(K∗)) and, outside the steady state, the capital tax evolves
according to τK = 1 for K < K
∗ and τK = −υ < 0 for K > K∗.
Because the system produces a steady state in which K, C and γ are con-
stants and η = 0, limt→∞Kγe−ρt = 0 and limt→∞Cηe−ρt = 0 hold.
Because the government’s choice set is more restrictive with the rule τK ≡
1 for t ∈ [0,∞) than with τK ∈ [−ν, 1], in the former case the welfare is lower,
HI < HII . Hence, proposition 1 yields the following result:
Proposition 6 The government prefers credible to non-credible public pol-
icy. In other words, it has no incentive cheat the public.
A government with a good reputation can always impose the same outcome as
one with a bad reputation, but it will never have an incentive do so. Because
the capitalist knows this, it relies on the announced tax policy and invests in
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capital. In propositions 1-6, parameters α and ϑ do not affect the main results
– the zero capital taxation in the limit and the equalization of the marginal
utility of income. Hence, despite changes in the capitalist’s social weight ϑ
or in her share of wages, α, the capitalist can expect that the main principles
of the tax policy will remain invariant. Because the consumption tax τC does
not appear in propositions 1-6, it balances the government budget.
8 Logarithmic utility
Now assume logarithmic preferences for the capitalist, σ → 1. Since with
τK = 1, the analysis is the same as in sections 5-7 and proposition 2 holds,
we can focus on the cases with τK < 1.
If ΠKK < 0, the system (13) and λ˙/λ = ρ − (1 − τK)ΠK converges to a
steady state where K and λ are positive constants and limt→∞ λKe−ρt = 0.
Next, consider the case ΠKK ≡ 0, for which Π = ΠKK holds by (12). Noting
(13) and (25), a steady state with C˙/C = K˙/K is then true only if
(1 + τC)C/K − αW/K = ρ. (37)
Given this, the equation C˙/C = K˙/K is true for α > 0 only if K, C and
λ = C−σ are positive constants. We conclude that in the cases where either
ΠKK < 0 or α > 0 (or both) holds, the analysis is the same as in sections
5-7. Consequently, propositions 3-6 hold.
Finally, examine the remaining case with ΠKK = 0 and α = 0. Given
(37), we then obtain C = ρK/(1 + τC). With the initial value C(0) =
ρK(0)/(1 + τC) for the co-state variable C, the system immediately jumps
into the steady state with K˙/K = C˙/C. This means that for a given wage
w and given taxes (τK , τW , τC), the capitalist plans to increase her capital K
and consumption C at the same rate K˙/K = C˙/C indefinitely. The common
growth rate K˙/K = C˙/C is positive (negative), when the average product
of capital, (1− τK)ΠK , is greater (lower) than the rate of time preference for
the capitalist, ρ.
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The government maximizes welfare
∫∞
0
[V ((1− α)W ) + ϑU(C)]e−ρtdt by
taxes (τW , τC) subject to (14), C = ρK/(1 + τC) and the function L(K, τW )
in (12). Given C = ρK/(1 + τC) and L(K, τW ), there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence from (τC , τW ) to (C,L), so that (τC , τW ) can be replaced by (C,L)
control variables. The Hamiltonian for the government is then given by
HIII = V
(
(1− α)W (L))+ ϑ log C
+ ζ
[
N(L) + F (K,L)− (1− α)W (L)− C − E − µK], (38)
where the co-state variable ζ evolves according to
ζ˙ = ρζ − ∂HIII/∂K = (ρ+ µ− FK)ζ = (ρ− ΠK)ζ, lim
t→∞
Kζe−ρt = 0.
Given (38), the first-order conditions for C and L are ∂HIII/∂C = 0 and
∂HIII/∂C = 0, which are equivalent to U ′ = ϑ/C = ζ and
0 = (1− α)(V ′ − ζ)W ′ + ζ(N ′ + FL).
Noting (5), (11) and (12), this equation is equivalent to (36) and (19). Given
ϑ/C = ζ, the capitalist’s consumption is determined by C˙/C = −ζ˙/ζ =
ΠK − ρ. Because the system C˙/C = ΠK − ρ and (14) produces a steady
state in which K, C and ζ = ϑ/C are constants, the transversality condition
limt→∞Kζe−ρt = 0 holds. Hence the government sets its tax parameters
so that the average product of capital, (1 − τK)ΠK , is equal to the rate of
time preference for the capitalist, ρ, and the capitalist’s common growth rate
K˙/K = C˙/C will be zero. We summarize the results of this section as:
Proposition 7 If (i) the capitalist has logarithmic utility σ → 1, (ii) she
earns no wages, α = 0, and (iii) the formal sector is subject to constant
returns to scale, FKK ≡ 0, then capital income should be taxed at a non-zero
rate and the optimal wage tax is given by (19). Otherwise, zero taxation on
capital income holds.
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The result that with logarithmic utility capital should be taxed at a non-
zero rate is the same as in Lansing (1999), but our interpretation is different.
If the capitalist does not earn wages from elsewhere in the economy and her
production is subject to constant returns to scale, her private economy will
grow in fixed proportion to her capital stockK. Furthermore, if the capitalist
has a logarithmic utility function, the income and substitution effect of future
interest rate movements exactly cancel each other, and she needs to observe
only the current (after-tax) rate of return to decide how much to consume
and save. From all of this it follows that the capitalist chooses a common
growth rate for her capital, income and consumption on the basis of the
current tax rate. In this situation, the government needs the capital tax as
a means of controlling the growth rate of the economy.
9 Conclusions
This paper examines optimal taxation in an economy with the following
properties: (i) There is a formal sector which can be taxed, and a informal
sector which cannot be taxed. (ii) The numeraire good, which can be con-
sumed, invested and used in public spending, is in the formal sector produced
from capital and labour, but in the informal sector from labour only. (iii)
Some households called capitalists save capital and earn a fixed proportion
of wages. (iv) The government taxes wages, capital income and consumption
to finance fixed public expenditures. The main results are as follows.
If the government cheated the public by promising low taxes in the earlier
periods and charging high taxes in the later periods, the capitalists would
stop investing and social welfare would fall. For this reason, the government
never has an incentive to cheat. Because the capitalists know this, there is
a reputational equilibrium in which the government follows its announced
strategy and the capitalists accumulate capital. In the advent of exogenous
changes, the consumption tax adjusts to balance the government budget, but
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the tax rules for capital and wages will be unchanged.
There is a socially optimal level of capital at which the marginal product
of capital equals the rate of time preference plus the depreciation rate and the
marginal product of labour is uniform in the economy. When capital stock
is above this optimal level, the government should discourage investment by
raising the capital tax as high as possible, and when capital stock is below
this optimal level, it should encourage investment by subsidizing capital as
much as possible. When capital is at its optimal level, it should generally
taxed at a zero rate. Only in the very special case where (a) a capitalist
has logarithmic utility and (b) earns no wages, and (c) the formal sector is
subject to constant returns to scale can the optimal capital tax differ from
zero in the steady state. In such a case, the capitalists’ consumption changes
in proportion to capital and the government needs the capital tax to bring
capital to the socially optimal level.
The optimal wage tax is determined by a specific elasticity rule. If all
households save capital, then public expenditures should be financed by the
non-distorting consumption tax and wages should be taxed at a zero rate.
The higher the proportion of wages the capitalists earn or the higher the
relative social value of their consumption, the higher the optimal wage tax.
The more inelastic the labour supply in the formal sector, the less the wage
tax distorts the economy and the more wages should be taxed to finance
government spending.
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